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CLASS VOTING IN BRITAIN IN 1979
ABSTRACT
British people are considered to be very aware of their social 
class and often categorize each other into either working class or 
middle class. Social class categorization usually depends upon a 
person's occupation, where doctors are considered middle class while 
those doing a manual job are considered to belong to the working class.
As well as categorizing people according to their occupation, a 
persons's social class may depend upon other variables, such as where 
one lives (working class people usually live in rented accommodation 
and middle class people buy their own homes), or whether one stayed at 
school beyond the legal minimum school leaving age (middle class). As 
well as people categorizing others into a social class, British people 
also have a subjective class identification and are often eager to 
admit to which class they belong. From their subjective class 
identification, the British, in the past, have used it as a guide as to 
how to vote in elections, so that middle class people usually voted for 
the Conservative Party, while working class people voted for the Labor 
Party.
In this study, we wanted to determine if this link between social 
class and vote has weakened. We find that the link is still quite 
strong, especially when using particular objective class variables.
But we find that there are two types of subjective class identifiers: 
passive and active. When people feel actively working class, then 
their tendency to vote Labor is greater than when they have only a 
passive affinity with the working class.
JACQUELINE SUSAN MART 
DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT 
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY IN VIRGINIA
CLASS VOTING IN BRITAIN IN 1979
INTRODUCTION
A widely held view of British society is that is is based on 
class. In this Introduction, we briefly review some of the 
literature on the subject which explores the nature of class and its 
link with voting behavior. A second generalization about British 
society and class is that the link between class and voting behavior 
has declined over the last decade and continues to weaken. We review 
some of the literature which looks at this question, paying 
particular attention to the impact of this decline on the fortunes of 
the Labor Party in particular. In the final section of the 
Introduction, we examine the nature of class in more detail.
The underlying theme for the rest of the paper is that because 
the objective working class are in the majority in Britain, then 
Labor should be perpetually in power if the link between party and 
class is unweakened. But there are changes in government from 
election to election. Before voters can vote according to their 
class, they must be aware of their class and it is a self-awareness 
of one's image which is an important factor in converting objective 
class into vote. Self-image, then, has to be a very powerful 
characteristic of class and subjective class must come into play 
because of the changes in government from election to election.
In Chapter One, we look at the global variable of occupational 
grade and its associated variable, income, in order to determine how 
the whole of the sample divides on subjective class and vote. We
find that only the two manual occupations contain a majority of the 
subjective working class and we use the non-manual/manual distinction 
throughout the paper so as to ensure that when we discuss the 
subjective working class, we are also referring to the objective 
working class (and not the objective middle class who may have a 
subjective working class identification).
We then move on to examine the other class variables: 
unionization (we also look at work sector: private and public), 
education and housing status to compare their individual effects on 
the subjective identity of manual workers. We also look at age and 
sex because both variables have been found in the past to have 
important effects on voting behavior. (Butler & Stokes, 1974). The
lasting effects of childhood socialization are undisputed 
(Greenstein, 1965 and Jennings and Niemi, 1968) and we compare the 
effects of family class and family party on the subjective image of 
manual employees. We use simple crosstabulations to compare the 
numbers of working class identifiers within each class variable and 
we examine the effects of these class variables on the Labor vote of 
the manual working class.
In Chapter Two, we attempt to look at subjective class in more 
detail and at the misidentifiers: those who are clearly part of the 
objective and subjective working class but who fail to register a 
Labor vote and as a result, vote Conservative. Apart from our 
findings in Chapter One, we find another possible explanation as to
why those who are objective and subjective working class vote
Conservative. The explanation is attributed to the strength with 
which one identifies with the working class: what we label "active"
4or "passive" working class. We assess which variables are affecting 
subjective class compared to those affecting the vote. We end the 
paper with multivariate analyses of class identification and vote.
Our conclusion is that while one cannot look at the British electoral 
system without looking at social class, looking at social class in 
terms of objective characteristics only is to ignore the powerful 
link between subjective class and voting behavior.
METHODOLOGY
Two political parties only are used throughout this paper: 
Labor and Conservative. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) had not 
been formed in 1979 and third party shares of the seats in parliament 
have never exceeded 2.2% and have only ever averaged 1.4%.
Throughout the paper, the tables all reveal certain amounts of 
objectively working class people subjectively identifying with the 
middle class. One possible theory is that the working class Tory may 
have come to acquire a middle class self-image through a Conservative 
Party socialization process resulting in an affinity with the middle 
class. Whatever the reason, the phenomenon is not examined in this 
paper.
THE BRITISH ELECTION SURVEY 1979
This paper is based on the 1979 British Election Survey. The 
1979 Survey is a part of a series of surveys which have been 
conducted between 1974 to 1979 by the British Election Study at the 
University of Essex and are also part of a series of surveys 
conducted between 1964 to 1970 by David Butler of Nuffield College,
Oxford and Donald Stokes, formerly of the University of Michigan.
The 1979 Survey was conducted in May of that year, after the 
general election. The basic sample was drawn from the electoral 
registers of 1974 and contains 3,400 individuals in a sample of 
constituencies (Northern Ireland is excluded). These individuals 
were surveyed in the two election of 1974, polled by mail 
questionnaires in the 1975 referendum on Britain's membership of the 
EEC, and interviewed in the 1979 Survey. The interviews for the May 
1979 Election Survey were carried out by professional market research 
bureaux. The British Election Study group at Essex wrote and 
designed the questionnaires and monitored the fieldwork. Coding of 
the questionnaires, data preparation and all the analyses were 
carried out at the University of Essex.
CLASS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR
The first systematic study of class voting in Britain entitled 
The Middle Class Vote was carried out in 1954 by John Bonham.
(Bonham, 1954). The general idea that came out of the work was that 
there was no emergence of a significant sized 'middle class' until 
after the second world war. The new Labor Party received a strong 
mandate from the working class for its program of social and economic 
reform. However, Bonham identified a large proportion of people who 
were neither poor, urbanized, nor industrialized, and who did not 
belong to the Marxist ruling class. This group constitutes what is 
now known as the middle class. The group did have a class interest 
as they formed the principal opposition to the working class of that 
time. By winning the 1945 election, Labor called attention to the
middle class. 6
The increasing affluence of the poor and industrialized 
working class lead Goldthorpe and Lockwood to the embourgeoisement 
thesis which posited that the Labor Party would increasingly become 
out of tune with these growing numbers of affluent workers. 
(Goldthorpe, et al, 1968). This thesis was based on the growing 
numbers of affluent, skilled, manual workers who were thought likely 
to be instrumental in their voting choices, and to weigh up the 
advantages and disadvantages of the parties before voting for the one 
most likely to protect their affluence. This was in marked contrast 
to the non-affluent manual worker who would automatically vote Labor 
because of class loyalty, reinforced by his economic conditions.
Butler and Stokes, on the other hand, argued that the Labor 
Party had been in existence for approximately sixty years and that 
later generations would establish an even firmer political loyalty to 
the Labor Party as children of Conservatives became a less and less 
significant force. (Butler & Stokes, 1974:267-268). Butler and 
Stokes felt that the collapse of Conservative strength in the early 
1960s disproved the embourgeoisement hypothesis, defined by Butler 
and Stokes as:
"... a process of conversion whereby the prosperous working 
class acquires the social and political self-images of the 
middle class as it acquires middle class consumption 
patterns." (Butler & Stokes, 1974:101).
Butler and Stokes looked at voting behavior in four different 
age cohorts: pre-1918; inter-war; 1945 and post-1951. They believed 
that as the Labor Party had evolved only since the first world war, 
it would take time for each generation to be exposed to Labor and to 
socialize its children into a party system where Labor was present.
Because loyalties are transmitted in the childhood home, time was 
needed for historic attachments to the ’bourgeois' parties to weaken 
and for ’secondary' processes to complete the realignment by class. 
Those in the 1945 and post-1950 cohorts are voters who were more 
strongly affected by such a process than the earlier cohort, and by 
the presence of Labor in the political system. The gap in cross 
voting between classes narrowed in the younger cohorts, which Butler 
and Stokes attributed to the decline of Conservative support in the 
working class rather than a rise of Labor strength in the middle 
class.
Although a Marxist analysis of class may be somewhat deficient 
in analyzing British politics, at least one class theorist agrees 
that it is the idea of the division of labor rather than property 
which is the basis for social stratification in Western Democracies. 
(Parkin, 1971). Hierarchies of occupations come about as a result of 
levels of authority at the workplace and of the amount of status and 
prestige that is accorded the occupations by society. Butler and 
Stokes (Butler & Stokes, 1974:70) found overwhelming evidence that 
occupation is the best guide to subjective class identity.
When asked what sort of people belong to the middle class, 61% 
gave the occupational characteristics of non-manual, white collar, 
skilled, professional, and self-employed as being typical of middle 
class people. Income and level of living described as rich, wealthy, 
and comfortably off came next in the characteristics which belong to 
middle class people (answered by 21%). When asked about working 
class people, occupation as a characteristic was given by 74% of 
respondents and working class occupations were described as manual,
8semi-skilled and unskilled, people who work for a living, and 
employees. Income and level of living (poor, low income, people who 
live in poor housing, in slums) were given next by 10% of 
respondents.
Authority relations at work were used by Weber (1947) and 
Dahrendorf (1959) to define class, and both studies are ultimately 
derived from the division of labor which stratifies Western 
societies.
In 1958, The Black-Coated Worker (Lockwood) took the 
discussion of social stratification based on occupation a step 
further and looked at a worker's "market situation" and his "work 
situation." This gave consideration to other components of 
occupation, such as income, job security and social relations. As 
Robertson notes, there is little problem in producing a ranking of 
occupations. The problem is where to make the cut-off points. 
(Robertson, 1984:11).
The most common method of stratification is to divide between 
manual and non-manual workers where manual workers constitute the 
working class and where non-manual workers make up the non-working 
class
category. The working class consist of manual occupational grades C2 
and D (semi-skilled and unskilled manual work) and the remainder (the 
non-working class) occupy grades A and B (higher and lower ranks of 
management), CIA (skilled non-manual workers) and C1B (skilled lower 
non-manual workers). We discuss these grades in more detail in 
Chapter One.
Research into voting behavior in Great Britain has
9consistently revealed a correlation between the class position of the
voter and the party they vote for. Pulzer wrote that:
"... class is the basis of British party politics; all else 
is embellishment and detail." (Pulzer, 1967:98).
Evidence followed to show that Britain displayed more class voting
than any other country in the Anglo-American system. (Alford, 1963).
We can expect a relationship between class and vote in Western
Democracies for the following reasons:
"... the existence of class interests, the representation 
of these interests by political parties, and the regular 
association of certain parties with certain interests.
Given the character of the stratification order and the 
way political parties act as representatives of different 
class interests, it would be remarkable if such a relation 
were not found." (Alford, 1963:68-9).
Alford devised an Index to show the level of class voting 
cross-nationally. (Alford, 1963:19). The Index equals the 
percentage of the working class voting for a left-wing party minus
the percentage of the country's middle class who vote for the left.
In 1979, for example, when 51% of workers voted for Labor and 22% of 
the middle class voted Labor, the Index was 51-22 or 29. The working 
class is defined as manual workers and the middle class as non-manual 
workers. The left-wing party is the party which stood overall for 
the social and economic interests of the working class in the 
particular country in question. At the time, (1954-1956), Britain 
stood out as the most class-ridden of four countries (UK, USA, Canada 
and Australia). (The Index for the UK was 41, followed by 34 for
Australia, 16 for the US and an Index of 8 for Canada).
In the UK, then, a relationship between objective class and 
vote is expected because of the polarization of the two main 
political parties' ideology where both parties espouse policies which
10
have clear class connections. Those who proclaimed the end of 
ideology in the 1950s and 1960s were wrong. The broad "Butskellite" 
consensus that reigned from the 1940s to the early 1970s broke down. 
This consensus consisted of an acceptance of the welfare state, a 
Keynesian mixed economy and a duty of the government to provide 
"full" employment, low rates of inflation and economic growth. While 
the two major parties had different priorities, they both had similar 
commitments.
During the 1970s, changes came which concentrated on the role 
of the state in modern society. The burden of the growing welfare 
state upon the country's economic performance was one of the forces 
which brought about change. Neo-liberal ideas of Hayek (1944) and 
Friedman (1971) began to permeate the Conservative Party, while Euro­
communism and professional left-wing activists began to mould Labor 
Party ideology in response. The Conservative Party in 1979 wanted to 
vigorously restrict the role of the state and was committed to 
economic liberalism and deregulation: it is not the duty of the
government to seek to implement any particular aspect of the good 
life; individuals should pursue it in their own way. On the other 
hand, the Labor Party wanted to extend the role of the state, 
particularly into the private sector in order to link private 
industry to social needs, not just to private profit. (See R. Plant, 
[1985], for a fuller discussion).
In Great Britain, the Conservative Party is a political party 
representing a variety of issue positions - less welfare legislation, 
lower personal taxation, less state intervention in the regulation of 
business. The Labor Party represents interests at the other end of
11
the spectrum: more welfare spending, the redistribution of wealth and 
the intervention of the state to regulate business. Originally, the 
Labor Party was set up by working class institutions to give 
political representation to working class economic interests. Class 
interests though are not compleltely homogeneous and never have been. 
Britain does not, as Alford notes, divide into two camps: one 
priviliged and the other oppressed. (Alford in Lipset & Rokkan, 
1967:78). For this reason, class interests are only one factor, 
albeit an important one, in voter behavior. Deviations from class 
voting may come then through a coalition of interests which cut 
across class lines.
Butler and Stokes (1969:4) speculated that changes in voting 
behavior could arise through the replacement of the electorate due to 
birth and death. They cited the transition from the Macmillan 
triumph in 1959 to the Wilson victory of 1964 as being caused in part 
by the replacement of older voters by younger cohorts. (Butler & 
Stokes, 1969: 4). Another cleavage to cut across class voting is the 
support that is given to a party for various odd reasons. (Butler & 
Stokes, 1969:5). Most importantly, voting may cut across class lines 
due to the electors' response to immediate issues and events.
(Butler & Stokes, 1969: 5). The 1979 "winter of discontent" was at 
least partly responsible for Labor's defeat at the polls later on 
that year. The immigration issue had the ability to convert 
substantial numbers of voters, both working and middle class, into 
Conservative support. (Butler Sc Stokes, 1969: 303-308).
Clearly, given the numerical dominance of the working class in 
Britain, and the electoral success of the Conservative Party, it is
12
obvious that there has been substantial working class Toryism. There
has always been the phenomenon in Britain of the working class
Conservative. Nordlinger observed that due to Britain's gradual
political development, there was a fusion of democratic and
hierarchical elements, with an emphasis on the latter. (Nordlinger,:
1967:Chapter 1). In Beer's words:
"our system is one of democracy, but of democracy by 
consent and not by delegation, of government of the people,
for the people, with, but not by, the people."
(Nordlinger, 1967:16).
The Tory tradition emphasizes hierarchy with the belief that it is
authoritative leadership which produces the good society - in essence
anti-democratic, although not authoritarian, since it is checked by
numerous constitutional conventions. Notwithstanding the differences
between Labor and Conservative, it is this Tory conception of the
relationship between government and the electorate which is widely
diffused through society, and it is this conception that gives rise
to working class Conservatism.
RECENT VOLATILITY IN CLASS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR 
But, since the 1960s, the British electorate has shown 
increasing volatility. This volatility has resulted in a decline in 
class voting with unfortunate results for the Labor Party. Labor's 
defeat by the Conservatives in 1970 led to four years in opposition 
but Labor was back in government by February 1974. Most of the 
writing on Labor's decline begins with the Party's defeat in 1979 and 
not surprisingly, because it is only in retrospect that the decline 
in its electoral performance can be assessed. The 1983 election 
defeat of Labor amounted to a continued erosion of its vote over more
13
than a quarter of a century.
The elections of February 1974, October 1974 and May 1979 
began to show significant departures in traditional voting patterns 
in Britain. In February 1974, the Conservative vote slumped by 8.6% 
(the sharpest loss by any party since 1945) while the decline of 6.0% 
of the Labor vote represented the worst deterioration by a major 
opposition party in 50 years. The 1970s witnessed a rise in the
'I
third party vote with smaller parties trebling their parliamentary
representation in February 1974. In 1977, Crewe remarked:
"[T]he coincidence of a national political crisis and marked 
electoral change can signify very different things. It may 
amount to no more than an historical movement, a temporary 
break from normal politics. Or it may mark a historical 
juncture, the end of one electoral era and the beginning of 
another." (Crewe, Sarlvik & Alt, 1977:133).
The 1979 election departed even further from old voting patterns
producing a 5.2% swing to the Conservatives with an electoral outcome
that was highest since the War in geographical uneveness.
"... the Conservatives' low stock in 1974 could be attributed 
to the combination of an increasingly fickle electorate and 
short term forces along. But the placing of the 1979 results 
in a long-term and comparative context does suggest a more 
enduring basis to Labor's electoral decline." (Crewe in 
Kavanagh, 1982:12).
Political scientists were cautious about calling the 1979 result a
victory for the Conservative Party. Sarlvik and Crewe's analysis of
the Conservative victory acknowledges that while the Conservative
share of the vote was below earlier post-war election victories and
its share of the total electorate was down, the margin of the
Conservative win owed itself to a low Labor vote and not a high
Conservative one.
"... the 1979 election was lost by the Labor government rather 
than won by the Conservative opposition. The result spoke
14
more eloquently of the electorate's rejection of Labor than of 
its embrace of the Conservatives." (Sarlvik & Crewe,
1983:5).
The Alford Index for Britain shown as a decline over time 
(1964-1979) and Crewe suggests a partisan dealignment thesis based on 
the increasing share of the vote gained by third parties. (Crewe, 
Sarlvik, and Alt, 1977). If party identification has been closely 
correlated with class in the past, then partisan dea’lignment also 
reveals a loosening in class identification.
In 1983, only 20.6% of the total electorate voted Labor, the 
worst result since 1918 for the Labor Party and a result which 
confirmed that Labor was now unpopular in opposition as well as in 
government. The Labor Party has traditionally always been the party 
of the working class. The emphasis is Crewe's because by the 1980s, 
he sees the Labor Party as being only a party of the working class. 
(Crewe in Kavanagh, 1982:11). The Labor Party began as an alliance 
in parliament of the Social Democratic Federation, the Fabian 
Society, the Independent Labor Party and the Trade Union movement and 
its objective was to try and reconcile in parliament the interests of 
working people with socialism. One of the main reasons why Labor 
lost the 1979 election was because of the desertion of the working 
class which actually switched to vote Conservative.
Paul Whiteley (1983:94-99) argues that voters not only have 
affective evaluations of the parties, but voters need also to make 
prospective as well as retrospective evaluations on performance.
Voters tend to judge Labor on its record in the past, not on future 
policies. Whiteley's findings that the common origin of the 
ideological, electoral and financial/membership crises within the
15
Labor Party is the failure of Labor to achieve its goals, especially 
in office.
Butler and Kavanagh (1980) identify five reasons for Labor's 
defeat in 1979: not listening to what the electorate wants; concern 
about trade union power which is linked to the issues of 
unemployment; prices and industrial relations; a failure to retain 
the support of the newly affluent worker and failure of the economy 
to grow.
Clearly, there are various theories which are put forward to 
explain the decline in the share of the vote for the Labor Party. 
Robertson's thesis is that class is still important and the idea of a 
classless volatile electorate is something which is superficial and 
hiding something much more complex. (Robertson, 1984). He believes 
that classes do matter electorally in Britain because nothing else 
does; for example, religion has ceased to play any part in British 
politics and there is no linguisitc cleavage except where it operates 
on a small minority in Wales.
While class voting could still be important for the reasons 
that Robertson states; British electoral politics has clearly changed 
dramatically in the last 20 years. Franklin attributes the change to 
the decline of class voting for the simple reason that class voting 
was held responsible for the stable pattern that persisted in the 
past. (Franklin, 1985: 5). The consumption model posits that people 
can be placed in one of two groups depending on whether important 
services in their lives are provided by the state or by the private 
sector: housing, health, education and transport. Voting choice is 
therefore based on rational self-interest, i.e. which party will best
serve and defend the services one uses. Franklin dismisses the 
consumer model of voting and the consumption cleavage approach 
because existing research provides no evidence to support the 
presence of a mechanism which would allow people to become aware of 
their interests. (Franklin, 1985: 30-33).
While the theories can account for different social groupings 
in Britain, they do not explain voting behavior. Socialization 
provides a mechanism by which a child growing up in a working class 
environment mimics working class behavior. Based on his results, 
Franklin was unable to confirm that the decline in class alignment 
was transitory, based on temporary changes in the class profile of 
the electorate. What he did find is that the decline in class voting 
has allowed an equivalent rise in issue-based voting choice. The 
British electorate has now moved to a more sophisticated basis for 
voting choice, being no longer constrained to the same extent by 
characteristics established during childhood and that British voters 
are now more open to issue-based argument.
WHAT IS CLASS?
Up to now, we have spoken about class in very general terms, 
where the middle class is defined as those engaged in non-manual 
work, while the working class includes manual or unskilled workers. 
But class does include more than occupational status, although this 
is the main component.
Franklin stresses that his model of class and voting behavior 
is implicit within Butler and Stokes' work although they present no 
such model and the model begins with the childhood home environment
17
where children are socialized into political preferences. (Franklin, 
1985:20). It is the type of home and the political preferences held 
by the adults there that determine the initial political 
socialization choices of the child. Parents voting for Labor will 
bring about children who initially vote Labor and parents who are 
working class are likely to raise a child who votes Labor.
The school environment is another important medium of 
socialization. Before the mid-1960s, schools in Britain were either 
grammar or secondary modern. Children were segregated into these 
schools at age 11 by means of an academic aptitude test (the 11- 
plus). If they failed the test, the children went to the secondary 
modern school but if they succeeded, they received a grammar school 
education. (Another alternative was to attend private school if the 
parents could afford to pay the fees). The middle-class were over­
represented in grammar schools and under-represented in secondary 
modern schools so that two schools within the education system had a 
class ethos, and education would intervene to reinforce the political 
preferences of the home environment. Since the 1960s, these school 
have been disappearing to be replaced by a single Comprehensive 
school; however, segregation according to academic prospects still 
occurs in the school and within the classroom with an over­
representation of the middle class amongst those who stay on at 
school beyond the minimum legal school-leaving age of 16 years.
Socialization does not end on leaving school but continues 
within the workplace. As we noted earlier, it is through one's 
occupation that we are able to characterize the political ethos of 
the workplace. Additionally, unionization is essentially a
18
characteristic of working class life and membership can reinforce 
this and increase the likelihood of voting Labor.
Butler and Stokes (1969:46) found that the immediate home 
environment was a politicizing component. The segregating influence 
of public housing within areas with large working class populations 
had political consequences. It limited cross-class contacts (as with 
educational segregation) and increased conformity of voting choice 
according to one's class.
CHAPTER ONE
OBJECTIVE CLASS
Social Grade and Income
As we saw in the Introduction to this paper, occupation has 
provided the main basis for characterizing class. The most commonly 
used scheme for classifying social grades was that proposed by a 
Working Committee of the Market Research Society and used by Butler
and Stokes in their first work, Political Change in Britain. Married
men and unmarried respondents are classified according to their own 
occupation while married women are classified according to their 
husband's occupation. The grades divide work into manual or non- 
manual, the skills and responsibilities of the job, whether 
employment or supervision of employees is involved, the prestige of 
the job, and the level of income. Those who think of themselves as 
working class should come from those jobs which are of a manual 
nature. The social grades corresponding to manual occupations are C2 
and D. The grades are as follows and the figure in parentheses is
the percentage of each grade found in the Survey.
19
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HIGHER MANAGERIAL - GRADE A (9%)
Company Directors University Teachers Doctors
Dentists Architects Surveyors
Clergymen Barristers Solicitors
also: Senior Managers with more than 25 subordinates
Self-employed Builders with 10 or more employees 
Farmers with over 500 acres
Scientists with professional qualifications 
Senior Government Officials
LOWER MANAGERIAL - GRADE B (13%)
Qualified Nurses Pharmacists
also: Farmers with 100-500 acres
Shop Proprietors with 4-9 employees 
Senior Managers with 10-25 subordinates 
Other Managers with 25 subordinates
Company Secretaries without professional qualifications
SKILLED NON-MANUAL - GRADE CIA (10%)
Draughtsmen Bank Clerks
also: Farmers with 30-90 acres
Telegraph Operators
Typists or Secretaries with at least one subordinate 
Civil Service Executive Officers
Local Authority Officers without professional qualifications
Commercial Travellers
Salesmen with a least one subordinate
Shop Proprietors with 3 or less employees
Managers with less than 25 subordinates
LOWER NON-MANUAL - GRADE C1B (12%)
Policemen Caretakers Innkeepers
Street Vendors Factory Guards Waiters
also: Shop Salesmen and Assistants
Telephone Operators 
Non-supervisory Clerks
SKILLED MANUAL - GRADE C2 (39%)
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Linesmen Fitters Print Workers
Firemen Painters Decorators
also: Coal Miners
Instrument Makers
Clothing Workers
Food, Drink and Tobacco Workers
Construction Workers
SEMI-SKILLED & UNSKILLED MANUAL - GRADE D (17%)
Gardeners Quarrymen Postal Workers
Porters Messengers Warehousemen
Farm Workers Dockworkers Laundry Workers
Domestic Workers
Turning to subjective class identification, we find somewhat 
surprisingly that only for the two highest occupational levels do 
middle class identifiers comprise a majority. (See Table 1).
However, the level of middle class identifiers (me) declines 
substantially as the occupation grades go down the hierarchy, while 
the number of working class (wc) identifiers increases. The figures 
in parentheses are those of Butler and Stokes (1969). Interestingly, 
there is an increase in 1979 compared to 1969 in the numbers of 
middle class identifiers amongst unskilled manual workers (Grade D) 
and a corresponding increase in working class identifiers amongst the 
skilled non-manual employees and even amongst higher management.
This might indicate the lessened polarization among the class at 
least in terms of identification. While Butler and Stokes found a 
difference in working class identification between Grade A and D of 
69% (22% of Grade A identified with the working class compared to 91% 
of Grade D), the difference in 1979 was down to 54.5%).
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Table 1:
Subjective Class By Occupational Grade In 1979
(A) (B) (CIA) (C1B) (C2 ) (D)
% % % % % %
me 74 (78) 63 (65) 48 (60) 35 (32) 19 (17) 17 (9)
wc 26 (22) 37 (35) 52 (40) 65 (65) 82 (83) 82 (91)
N=140 N=217 N=167 N-191 N=632 N=272
In 1979, the Conservatives gained a majority in all social 
grades except C2 an D, the two manual occupations. (See Table 2). 
Given the traditional role of class in British politics, it is not 
surprising to find that class is highly correlated with vote. But a 
working class job does not automatically translate into a Labor vote 
and this was especially true in 1979. While the Labor vote has 
increasead among the three highest job grades since 1969, the Labor 
vote has declined (with the Conservative vote increasing) within the 
three lowest occupational groupings, particularly amongst those whom 
we can confidently call the objective working class (C2 and D). In 
line with lessened objective class polarization in terms of class 
identification we find a lessened vote polarization by objective 
class.
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Table 2:
Vote By Occupational Grade In 1979
(A) (B) (CIA) (C1B) (C2) (D)
% % % % % %
Lab 23 28 21 36 59 59
Con 77 72 79 64 41 41
N=105 N=177 N-117 N=144 N=450 N=203
A working class self-image does not translate into a majority
Labor vote from those in CIA and C1B. Although, as Butler and Stokes 
found, only these two classes deliver majority support for Labor.
Income
But there are other determinants of class besides job 
classification, and we shall explore several of these. The most frequent 
alternative to occupation is simply income. The average income in 
Britain in April 1979 for males and females across all industries was 
just over 86 pounds per week, with the average household income standing 
at 104.50 pounds per week. At the very least, we would expect to find 
that those on a low income would have a self-image of being working class 
because occupation and income are highly correlated. But one might 
expect a more substantial effect since those within an occupational grade 
earning less should be more likely to identify with the working class. 
Those on higher incomes should therefore have a middle class self-image. 
Those who think of themselves as middle class then, earn more than those 
who have a working class self-image. This can be seen to be true from 
the following table:
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Table 3:
Subjective Class Identification By Weekly Income
Up to 58 ppw 140+ ppw
% %
me 23 77
wc 7 7 23
N=658 N=97
While 52% of the sample who earned up to 58 pounds per week voted 
Labor, 77% of those earning 140+ pounds per week voted Conservative.
(See Table 4). (The Conservative vote increases amongst those who earn 
above average pay and continues to increase as income becomes higher). 
Labor's lead however over the Conservatives is only marginal amongst the 
poorest in Britain, whilst among the richest, the Conservative lead is 
over 50%.
Table 4:
Share Of The Two Party Vote By Weekly Income
Up to 58 ppw 140+ ppw
-  -
Lab 52 23
Con 48 77
N=658 N=97
Since our concern is primarily with the failure of the Labor Party 
to hold on to working class votes, we will be focussing on occupational
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grades C2 and D. These are the two manual categories (which make up 56% 
of the respondents in the Survey), and are the two categories which have 
shown majority support for Labor since 1965. This therefore implies that 
these two grades should also be those who identify with the working 
class. From this point onwards, we will look at those whom we define as
objective working class - manual workers - and who are the only group to
vote in a majority for the Labor Party.
Work Sector
Since the second world war, the public sector in Britain has 
continued to expand with a corresponding increase in persons employed 
both by central and by local government. The Labor Party has always 
stood for the further increase and protection of this sector, while the 
Conservative Party was pledged to reduce its size if the Party was 
elected at the polls in 1979. Crewe sees these arguments as suggesting 
that the vote may have divided along these lines. (Sarlvik & Crewe,
1983: 95). This means that those who worked in the public sector were 
more likely to vote Labor than Conservative in order to protect their 
jobs. While the Labor vote from the public sector is slightly higher 
than the Labor vote from those employed in the private sector, it is 
nothing like the difference between the vote of manual and non-manual 
workers. (Compare Table 5 with Table 2). Not surprisingly, the fiercest 
resistance to the Labor government's 5% cap on public sector pay
increases in 1979 came from the public sector, resulting in the "winter
of discontent." Crewe believes this to be one reason for the lower Labor 
vote, since the issues in the electoral campaign did not neatly fit into 
the public/private sector divide, and did not mobilize public sector 
employees to support Labor. (Sarlvik & Crewe, 1983: 95). If Crewe is
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correct about public/private sector differences, and if this extends to 
differences within the working class, it does not necessarily follow that 
the abnormally low levels of Labor voting among public sector manual 
workers should be reflected in low levels of working class 
identification. That is, public sector workers should see their class 
interests more clearly than private sector workers and, therefore, 
identify strongly with the working class.
Table 5:
Vote In 1979 By Private/Public Sector 
Manual Employees
Private Public
% %
Lab 59 64
Con 41 36
N=304 N=172
Such is not the case, however. In normal times, we would expect 
Labor to do significantly better amongst manual workers in the public 
sector.
From Table 6, it can be seen that in 1979, there was a difference 
of only 4% in the levels of subjective working class identification 
between private and public sector employees. However, this should not 
obscure the extremely high levels of identification evident in both 
groups.
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Table 6:
Subjective Class Identification By Private/Public 
Manual Employees
Private Public
% %
me 18 14
wc 82 86
N=440 N=228
Union
If public and private sector employment might be expected to have a 
marginal effect on voting patterns, unionization should be expected to 
have a much more direct impact. Manual occupation unions have long had a 
strong identification with the Labor Party. The Labor Party, after all, 
was set up to give parliamentary representation to working-class 
institutions, and the unions retain a large official vote in Labor Party 
internal affairs. Unions organize and bring workers together. In so 
doing, they stress the commonality of worker and class experience. As 
Franklin notes, unionization "... can reinforce a working class 
occupational ethos and so increase the likelihood of Labor voting." 
(Franklin, 1985: 17). By reinforcing the fact that their members are 
members of the working class, and by members having a relationship with 
other unionized workers and an indirect one with the Labor Party, one
would expect to find that one's subjective class, if unionized, would be
located within the working class. We should expect to find then that 
union members are more likely to identify with the working class, and to
take that class identity with them to the voting booth.
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Table: 7
Subjective Class Identification Of Unionized and 
Non-Unionized Manual Workers
Unionized Non-Unionized
Members Families
% : %
me 14 18
wc 86 82
N=346 N=3 65
Unionization only has a very small effect on one's subjective 
working class identity (4%), which is surprising considering unionization 
is a characteristic of life in the working class. (See Table 7). But 
when it comes to the Labor vote, although the Labor vote drops, it is far 
better for the Labor Party to rely on union members than on non-unionized 
workers. Nearly 70% of union members voted Labor, while in families 
where there are no unionized employees, only 45% of the respondents voted 
Labor. Unionization increases the Labor vote by almost 25% over its vote 
from non-unionized workers.
We should expect to find, then, that union members are more likely 
to identify with the working class, and to take that class identify with 
them to the voting booth. Table 8 shows strong support for the voting 
hypothesis. While less than half of all non-unionized families supported 
Labor in 1979 (45%), almost 70% of unionized manual workers did, a 
difference of almost 25% Support for the identification hypothesis is, 
on the other hand, a bit weaker. Unionized members are only 4% more 
likely to identify with the working class than are non-unionized manual
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employees. Although this difference is small, we inust remember that the 
levels of identification are rather high to begin with and given this 
fact, the differences are not unimportant.
Table 8:
Vote In 1979 Of Unionized and Non-Unionized 
Manual Workers
Unionized
Members
Non-Unionized
Families
% %
Lab 69.5 45
Con 30.5 55
N=22Q N=182
However, it could be that non-unionized workers tend to be lower 
in class grade than unionized workers. If so, this might explain the 
small difference. It does turn out that 75% of unionized manual 
employees come from the C2 grade whilst only 64% of non-union workers do 
so. Dividing the sample into these two groups and testing the effect of 
unionization on class identification, we find an augmented effect on 
Grade D workers (a difference in working class identification of 10%), 
and approximately the same impact as before on Grade C2 workers.
Unionization clearly has an added effect on one's working class 
self-image, (see Table 9). We can control again for the effects of 
working class occupations upon the relationship between unionization and 
the vote. (See Table 10).
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Table 9:
Subjective Class Identification Of Unionized and
Non-Unionized Skilled Manual Workers
C2 Unionized C2 Non- 
Unionized
% %
me 15 18
wc 85 82
N=261 N-233
Vote
Table 10:
In 1979 Of Unionized And Non-Unionized
Manual Employees
C2 Unionized C2 Non- 
Unionized
% %
Lab 71 41.5
Con 29 58.5
N=17 6 N-171
Unionization then, has a much larger effect on the Labor vote than 
on one's subject class image, as seen in comparing Table 9 with Table 10, 
although occupational Grade D respondents who are not in a union vote 
Labor in greater numbers than non-unionized workers in Grade C2. In 
fact, Labor keeps its majority amongst unskilled workers whether they are 
in a union or not. The Labor Party has a clear lead over the
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Conservatives amongst C2 union members but amongst non-unionized Grade C2 
employees, there is no natural Labor vote.
Housing Status
Local housing policy has long been a point of contention between 
the Conservative and Labor Parties. The Conservative Party has 
supported fewer public housing starts, lower tax rates on property, and 
higher rents on public housing. Labor has favored the opposite in all 
cases. As a result, in normal years we should expect to find council 
housing tenants to be particularly strong Labor supporters. In addition, 
by bringing working class individuals together in common residential 
locations, we should expect to find enhanced levels of working class 
identification among council housing tenants.
But 1979 was no ordinary election year. What made it different in 
relation to the council housing issue was the Conservatives had pledged 
to allow council house dwellers to buy their homes at discounted prices. 
As Sarlvik and Crewe point out, this stand cross-pressured council 
tenants who were on the verge, given a Conservative victory, of becoming 
home owners. (Sarlvik & Crewe, 1983: 100). Such an opportunity could be 
expected to weaken both support for Labor among council housing tenants, 
and possibly to weaken the levels of class identification, although the 
latter is clearly more speculative. (Butler and Stokes did find a 20% 
drop in working class identification among those who moved from council 
housing into home ownership). (Butler & Stokes, 1969:102-104).
The data are ambiguous on both counts. Council tenants remained 
more likely to identify with the working class (by a 10% difference 
compared with home owners), and significantly more likely to vote Labor 
(by a margin of 21%). (See Tables 11 and 12). Possibly the lack of
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confidence in how the program would work out limited the effect of the 
council housing issue in 1979, although by the 1983 election, its effect 
was obvious, as council house purchasers shifted in large numbers to the 
Conservatives. (Sarlvik & Crewe, 1983: 102).
Table 11:
Subjective Class Identification Amongst 
Manual Workers By Housing Status
Home Owners Council Tenants
% %
me 23 13
wc 77 87
N=398 N=383
As can be seen from Table 12, 72% of council house tenants 
registered a Labor vote while amongst home owners, the vote was split 
practically equally between the two parties.
Table 12:
Vote In 1979 Of Manual Workers 
By Housing Status
Home Owners Council Tenants
% %
Lab 51 72
Con 49 28
N=298 N=280
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Socialization Effects
Up to this point, we have been examining current experiences, and 
their effect on identification and vote. We will now turn briefly to two 
variables which predate adult experiences: childhood home and school 
experiences. As Stern and Searing (1973) and others find, social class 
is one of the earliest identifications formed by children. As a result 
we should expect to find important precursors of current identifications, 
which in turn are molded by childhood experiences.
One of the most important, indeed the most important, of these
experiences is one's family's social class identification. Coming from a 
working class environment exposes one to experiences which will bring out
working class identification, but the role of direct transmission should
not be ignored. Even though we are looking only at manual workers in the 
two lowest occupational categories, we should therefore still expect to 
find important residues of childhood class experience, and an important 
secondary effect on vote.
As Table 13 shows, there is a very strong support for the 
childhood socialization model for class identification. Up to now, we 
have not seen any variable which accounted for more than a 20% difference 
in working class identification within the manual worker categories.
Now, however, we see a 37% difference. Manual workers with middle class 
parents were almost four times as likely to identify with the middle 
class as were respondents from a working class background.
The effect on vote is somewhat less (only about 20%), but it is 
still one of the strongest effects that we have found so far. (See Table 
14).
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Table 13:
Subjective Class Identification Of Manual Workers 
By Parents1 Class
Middle Class Working Class
% %
me 50 13
wc 50 87
N=119 N=773
Vote In
Table 14: 
1979 Of Manual Workers By Parents' Class
Middle Class Working Class
% %
Lab 40 61
Con 60 39
N=83 N=560
Furthermore, if we expand our socialization concerns and look at 
parents' party in relation to respondent's vote, we find a very wide 
difference. In Table 16, we see that while over 3/4 of those respondents 
from Labor homes were Labor voters in 1979, only about 1/4 of those from 
Conservative homes were Labor supporters in 1979.
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Table 15:
Subjective Class Identification Of Manual Workers
By Parents 1 Party
Both Both
Conservative Labor
% %
me 26.5 14
wc 73.5 86
N=147 N=384
Table 16:
Vote In 1979 Of Manual Workers By Parents1 Party
Both Both
Conservative Labor
-  -
Lab 27 78
Con 73 22
N=111 N=289
Age Left School
Since the mid 1960s, the number of secondary modern and grammar 
schools has decreased since the idea of the comprehensive school was 
introduced. It is therefore a worthless task to try and discern where 
people were educated. We might ask whether the school was a state school 
or a private one, but as so few in the Survey were educated in fee-paying 
schools, we are still not adequately getting at this class
36
characteristic. This is why Franklin uses the age at which the 
respondent left school. (Franklin, 1985: 12-15). Most ''grammar school 
types” will be those who stay on at school beyond the minimum legal 
school-leaving age. Franklin also notes, rightly, that comprehensive 
schools do not mean that working class and middle class, bright and not 
so bright, are mixing together. While they may all be schooled under one 
roof, segregation is carried out between and within the classroom. This 
variable is of course linked to one's education and eventually one's 
occupation and income. Those who left school at the earliest legal 
opportunity are more likely to be from working class backgrounds and to 
end up in jobs lower down the occupational hierarchy earning an average 
or below average wage. From the tables below, we can see that those who 
think of themselves as working class will more than likely have left 
school at the minimum school-leaving age. (In the Survey, 81% left 
school before the age of 16 years and another 14% left school at 16 years 
of age). Those who stayed at school longer are almost twice as likely to 
think of themselves as middle class as those leaving before the age of 16 
years. Notice, though, the majority of manual workers who left school at 
15 years as against those who stayed on until 16 years and older.
Table 17:
Subjective Class Identification Of Manual Workers 
By Age Left School
0-15 years 16 years 17-18+ years
% % %
me 17 23 26
wc 83 77 74
N=711 N=141 N=46
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Table 18:
Vote In 1979 Of Manual Workers By Age Left School
0-15 years 16 years 17-18+ years
% % %
Lab 61 52.5 48.5
Con 39 47.5 51.5
N=520 N-101 N=33
Demographics
The final two variables we shall examine are the important 
demographics of age and sex. All the foregoing components of class play 
a role in transmitting class identification, and in linking it to vote, 
but non-class variables may also attenuate or amplify objective- 
subjective class correspondence by structuring the kinds of experiences 
that individuals have. Foremost among these are sex and age. By being 
born into a particular birth cohort, one's future experiences are shaped. 
If one is born into a small cohort, that might mean higher pay for the 
same work and even though the class of one's job is the same, the 
experience of that job, and the monetary reward attached to it may not.
On the other hand, being born at a time of relative affluence might make 
one's own relative poverty stand out more strongly and reinforce class 
identification.
Age is also important in defining the point at which one is in the 
life cycle. Being in a lower class job at 55 years of age is very 
different from being in one at the age of 25 years, and the strength of 
one's identification might be expected to vary accordingly.
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Similarly, males and females have very different experiences. It 
is important to remember that females are rated according to their 
husbands' jobs. Since they do not come into close contact with other 
working class individuals in the work environment, we might expect their 
levels of class identification to lag behind those of males. Similarly, 
this might reinforce the expectation, based on the 10 elections between 
1945 and 1974, that women are likely to vote Conservative (true in 7 out 
of the 10 elections) and men are likely to favor Labor (true in 9 of the 
10 elections).
Looking first at age effects. We have divided the sample simply
into decades of life, while breaking the youngest group in half. This
leaves us with the following age categories: 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59 
and 60+. Doing so, we find only a very mild effect of age on class 
identification. Although the relationship is mildly monotonic, levels of 
working class identification vary only between 86% for the youngest 
cohort and 22% for the oldest cohort. The youngest cohort includes both 
the baby boom generation and the group coming of age during relative 
affluence. This may have served to counteract the "optimism of youth" 
effect that we had also expected to find. (See Table 19).
Finally, turning to sex differences in identification and vote, we
find little of importance. Females from manual worker homes are only
slightly less likely to identify with the working class, and not at all 
more likely to vote for the Conservatives. (See Tables 21 and 22).
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Table 19:
Subjective Class Identification Of Manual Workers By Age
18-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+
% % % % % %
me 20.5 13 17 17 19 21
wc 79.5 87 83 83 81 79
N=78 N=100 N=208 N=160 N=160 N=198
Although the percentage differences across all age groups are not 
significant, it would seem that from the following table, we can say that 
the working class are nore numerous amongst the young and less numerous 
amongst older manual workers.
Table 20:
Vote In 1979 Of Manual Workers By Age
18-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+
% % % % % %
Lab 56.5 63 62 62 57 54
Con 43.5 37 38 38 43 46
N=46 N=62 N=146 N=122 N=128 N=156
Crewe (Sarlvik & Crewe: 1983: 91-3) finds that when compared with
the 1974 election, the swing to the Conservatives from the electorate as 
a whole was not as great from the old as from the young (+14% amongst the 
18-24 year olds and +6% among the over 65s). Labor in fact lost most of 
its ground since 1974 among the traditionally fickle young.
40
Table 21:
Subjective Class Identification 
Of Manual Workers By Sex
Male Female
% %
me 18 18.5
wc 82 81.5
N=48 7 N=417
Table 22:
rote In 1979 Of Manual Workers
By Sex
Male Female
% %
me 58 60
wc 42 40
N=346 N=314
Summary
We began the paper with two generalizations that are widely held 
by observers of the British political system. First, that British 
society and politics are based on class; secondly, that the link between 
class and vote has declined over the last decade and continues to weaken. 
The results of the elections in Britain since the 1970s show that 
substantial numbers of the traditional working class (those in manual 
occupations) have moved from voting in a majority for Labor to dividing 
their support almost equally between the Conservative Party and the Labor
41
Party.
To examine the link between class and vote in more detail, we need 
a more sophisticated definition of class than that of middle class being 
non-manual workers and working class people being employed in manual 
occupations. We therefore used Franklin's model of class: 
childhood socialization : school environment : workplace socialization. 
Parents' class and parents' party introduce children to their early 
political values which could be reinforced within the school and within 
the workplace through income, occupation, work sector and unionization.
We looked only at manual employees using this model of class, and their 
subjective class identification was determined by asking whether the 
respondent thought of himself or herself as working class or middle 
class.
We found unionization to have a strong effect on the Labor vote 
and more particularly, strong support for the childhood socialization 
effect on class identification as well as on vote.
CHAPTER TWO
SUBJECTIVE CLASS
Up to now, we have been using a simple idea of class
identification. We have defined the subjective working class as those
who stated that they were working class, whether they gave that response
spontaneously in response to an open-ended question, or after being
prompted to put themselves into either the working class or the middle
class. But those who did not need prompting into their class
identification constituted less than half of the sample. Over half did
not identify with either class when asked the following question:
"One often hears talk about social classes. Do you ever 
think of yourself as belonging to any particular class.
IF YES, which class is that?"
In response to that question, 17.5% placed themselves in the
middle class category, and 30% in the working class. These individuals
are considered active class identifiers. When asked to make a choice
between being middle class and working class on the follow-up question,
less than 10% were unable to do so, and of the 91% who did make a choice,
68% identified with the working class. These respondents are considered
passive class identifiers. This gives us four categories:
Active working class (30.2% of all identifiers);
Passive working class (35.4% of all identifiers);
Passive middle class (16.7% of all identifiers);
Active middle class (17.7% of all identifiers).
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We will now move to a discussion of the determinants of active 
class identification among the objective working class (i.e. manual 
workers), and of the effects of our independent variables on the vote 
decision, controlling for level of class identification. In order not to 
be too repetitive, we will first examine the most important determinants 
individually at the zero-order level and then move to a consideration of 
the multivariate model relating background variables to class 
identification, and then relating these, plus class identification, to 
voting behavior.
Social Grade
We turn first to the two most common objective class components, 
social grade and income. It is among the two grades of manual workers 
(C2 and D) that Labor receives a majority of its vote. But within each 
of these grades, the difference in Labor vote between passive and active 
class identifiers is substantial. Using the following tables and looking 
first at skilled manual workers (C2), Labor support is 19% higher among 
active working class identifiers than among passive identifiers, and 
Conservative support is twice as great among middle class identifiers as 
among active working class identifiers. Among the less skilled manual 
workers, the difference between active and passive identifiers is less 
(11%) but still clearly significant. Once again, active identifiers are 
only half as likely to support the Conservatives as the middle class 
identifiers.
For neither grade does even half the sample actively identify with 
the working class, and there is little difference between the two grades 
in the percentage actively identifying with the working class (40% versus 
42%). Similarly, there is no difference in Labor support between the two
44
grades for the active working class. There is, however, a 7% difference 
in Labor support among the passive working class. That this is so should 
not be surprising. For those respondents who identify actively with the 
working class, such identification should result in strong Labor support, 
particularly as they are objectively working class as well. But for 
those who identify only passively, their objective situation should have 
a stronger effect on their vote. And clearly, the unskilled manual 
workers are going to be subject to more pro-Labor influences than their 
more affluent brethren.
Table 23:
Vote Of Skilled Manual Workers In 1979
Active WC Passive WC MC
% % %
Lab 71.3 52.4 42.7
Con 28. 7 47.6 57.3
N=181 N=170 N=82
Vote
Table 24 
Of Unskilled Manual Workers In 1979
Active WC Passive WC MC
% % %
Lab 70.5 59.1 38.5
Con 29.5 40.9 61.5
N=78 N=88 N=26
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Income
Looking next at income categories, we continue to find the 
dominant effect of subjective class identification. For both those 
making less than 58 pounds per week, and for those making more than 58 
pounds per week, active identifiers support Labor substantially more than 
do passive identifiers. The difference is 15% for the low income 
category and 18% for the higher income category. On the other hand, 
there is no substantial difference between the income levels in Labor 
support from either the active or the passive working class. Income is 
also unrelated to the likelihood of active working class identification. 
Forty percent of the lower income group and 43% of the higher income 
group, actively identify with their objective class.
Unions
Unions provide enormous organizational and financial support for 
the Labor Party. In addition, of course, they have a formal position of 
power in the Party. We have seen earlier that union membership is 
strongly related to vote, but how strongly is it related to active class 
identification, and how much of the effect of union membership remains 
once we control for level of identification?
To begin with, union membership does not raise the level of active 
class identification above that of the sample as a whole. Only 45% of 
the union members with manual jobs actively identify with the working 
class. For non-union families, the percentage falls only to 39%.
The role of unionization is clear, however, in its ability to 
blunt the effect of class identification. And the effect is not limited 
to union members, but extends to spouses with equal impact. For both 
union members and spouses of union members, it makes little difference
46
whether one actively or passively identifies with the working class. For 
both groups, at least 65% of passive working class identifiers and at 
least 74% of active working class identifiers support the Labor Party, 
and the difference is, in both cases, 10% or less.
Among those respondents with no union members in the family, the 
class identification effect reasserts itself. Active working class 
identifiers are more than 20% more likely to support Labor than are 
passive working class supporters. Once again, without the constraint of 
union membership, the natural effect of class identification is evident. 
(And similarly, the effect of union membership is far greater on the vote 
of passive identifiers, 28%, than of active identifiers, 18%).
Housing Status
Housing status has an effect very similar to that of union 
membership. Once again, there is little difference in the percentage of 
active class identification between those who own their home and those 
who live in council/new town housing. Forty-three percent of the former 
and 41% of the latter identify actively with the working class. But, 
again, there is an overriding effect of council housing on the vote.
Among those who live in council housing, 71% of the passive working class 
and 77% of the active working class voted for the Labor Party, a 
difference of only 6%.
Again, there is a strong class effect among those respondents who 
own their houses or flats. Within this group, almost twice as many 
active working class identifiers as passive working class identifiers 
supported Labor.
Looking at the data in another way, we find, similar to the effect 
of social grade, that it is among the passive working class that other
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factors come into play. Active identifiers differ by only 8% in their 
Labor support according to their home-owning status, but among the 
passive working class, the difference is 34%. Just like the experience 
of council house living, the subject experience of working class 
identification can overcome objective differences, resulting in an 
homogenous vote for the active identifiers.
Family Effects
Turning next to family effects, we will examine both class and 
political inclinations of family. Our expectation should clearly be that 
family social class when one is growing up should most strongly affect 
one's own class identify, but that political inclinations of parents 
should be more important for voting behavior and partisanship in one's 
adult years.
Both of these expectations are borne out. Among those manual 
worker respondents from middle class families, only 10% actively identify 
as working class, while among those from working class homes, 46% so 
identify. Although there is a tendency for respondents from Conservative 
homes to be less likely to actively identify with the working class than 
those from Labor homes (31% versus 47%), the difference here is far 
smaller.
On the other hand, the effect of childhood political environment 
is far greater than that of childhood social class environment. For all 
three subjective class groups, the effect of family political background 
on vote is greater than 30%, ranging from 31% for active working class to 
56% for passive working class to 52% for the middle class identifiers.
The effect of family social class on vote, within categories of 
subjective class, ranges only from 6% to 25%. Although this latter
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effect is not insignificant, it does pale by comparison with partisan 
background effects.
Sex
Finally, we turn to sex as a determinant of class and vote. Given 
that a substantial percentage of females are not in the workforce, it 
might be expected that they would be less likely to identify actively 
with their objective family class, and that they would be less likely to 
translate this identification, even when it was present, into votes.
The data however refute this expectation. There is virtually no 
difference in the percentages of males and of females, from objective 
working class homes, who actively identify with the working class (42% of 
females and 41% of males). Furthermore, with the exception of middle 
class identifiers, where females are actually 10% more likely than males 
to support Labor, there are no sex differences at all in the level of 
Labor support within subjective class categories.
Summary
Overall, it is clear that at the zero order at least, the effects
of our selected variables (with the notable exception of childhood class
environment) on subjective class identification are far weaker than these 
effects on vote. Furthermore, although the relationship was by no means 
completely consistent, the passive working class was more subject to 
objective experience effects than was the passive working class. But 
what we need to do in order to pull the model together is to test the
independent effect of our variables on both subjective class and vote
while controlling for all of the other variables' effects. Only in so 
doing can we ascertain and compare both the direct effects on class 
identification and the direct and indirect effects of our variables on
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vote. It is to these regression models that we now turn.
CHAPTER THREE
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES OF CLASS IDENTIFICATION AND VOTE
Entering all of the explanatory variables into our regression
equation at the same time greatly simplifies our model of class
identification. Using all ten predictors emphasizes the strong effect of
family social class. Even controlling for education, social grade of
job, income, age, sex, and the other predictors, family social class's
effect is unchanged. The zero order correlation between subjective class
identification and family class was .28. The partial correlation,
controlling for nine other variables is .26. Furthermore, the multiple R
including all ten predictors is .33, only slightly higher than the
partial for family social class.
Remarkably, only one other variable (age) is even significantly
related to class identification, and in this the coefficient barely
reaches significance (t=2.042). This is interesting in that it shows the
trend, evident across Western Europe and the United States, that the
younger voters are much less class oriented than the parental generation.
On the other hand, neither income nor social grade nor work sector
achieves significance at even the .10 level.
Obviously, the important factors here are the dominant role of
socialization, and the failure to explain subjective class any better
than we have. Using 10 plausible predictors, we are able to explain only
8% of the variance. This is partially due to the restricted variance of
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both dependent and independent variables (since we are looking at a 
reasonably homogenous population, i.e. manual workers), but as well, it 
points out the difficulties in trying to understand the development of 
class consciousness, even in a class conscious country like Britain. 
(Obviously, the use of contextual data would improve our ability to 
explain variance, although it is questionable by how much).
Moving on to the prediction of vote, we find substantially greater 
predictability overall. Using 11 predictors, we are able to explain more 
than 16% of the variance. But still the use of regression simplifies our 
model significantly. Only 4 of the 11 predictors have statistically 
significant effects on vote, and interestingly, none of these overlap 
with the predictors of working class identification. Clearly the 
strongest effect on vote is parental partisanship. This finding is in 
keeping with the socialization finding of the strong effect of childhood 
social class experiences on respondent's current identification. In both 
cases, early experiences continue to influence British voters.
In addition, two other variables have strong effects, union 
membership and class identification. Interestingly, union membership has 
no effect on class consciousness, but a strong direct effect on vote.
This can of course be attributed to the strong organizational effort that 
unions are able to mount on behalf of the Labor Party at the time of the 
election. Even if they can not change long term class attitudes, unions 
seem to be able to deliver their members on election day.
The effect of subjective class identification is of course to be 
expected. It is interesting that social grade shows a beta of only .02, 
and that income is barely significant (t=*2.033), with a beta of only .11, 
while class identification shows a beta of .16, even with the controls
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for objective class. Furthermore, subjective social class has a 
substantially greater effect on vote with delineation between active and 
passive working class identification, than it did without such a 
distinction.
(Eliminating the non-significant coefficients, and re-running the 
models produces shifts of no more than .02 in the beta coefficients).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have established the importance of subjective 
class identifications, showing them to be more important in terms of the 
vote than more objective measures. In addition, we have been able to 
suggest determinants of subjective class. Whether we use a simple 
dichotomy or a more complicated measure, the role of social class of 
family while growing up is very strong, especially when we consider the 
absence of any other strong effects among the variables we examined. 
Clearly, class is transmitted from generation to generation, and seems to 
remain relatively impervious to current conditions of employment, 
education, etc.
The role of this generational transmission is reinforced with the 
predictions of vote. First, the single most important factor in vote is 
parental partisanship, a factor which shares the childhood genesis with 
social class, and second, class identification has a strong direct effect 
on vote.
To attempt to understand the British electoral decision without 
reference to social class is futile. But to explain social class with 
reference to only current job, union membership and the like is telling 
far less than half the story.
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